Course Work Essay

As the Vice President of the Sales, it is his responsibility in the first place to handle sales management leadership and sales compensation program according to David J. Cichelli (p. 38) and not the products being sold in the market. Therefore, it is inappropriate for a new Vice-President of Sales to discuss defective wrenches before a CEO meeting especially that he is unaware of the ethical guidelines being practiced by the organization. In this case, he has to take extra care to discuss the matter to the group without appearing discourteous or impolite. In the first place, the newly hired CEO (Vice President of Sales) has the idea of communicating the concept of customer satisfaction that is vital in the growth of sales as well as important in his role as sales management leader to provide the utmost satisfaction. He also wants to ensure that collaboration among members of the team is practiced as he assumes his duty as part of the CEO team. Evaluating the scenario, he has to look into several avenues and prepare materials to support his argument. First, he has to review the policies of the organization as well as a survey on customer feedback of the product conducted previously, from where he will base his argument. Any information about the company’s structure, ethical guidelines, and procedures will help him shape his analysis and proposal to redirect the company’s concept of customer satisfaction. Tactfully, he may present the problem as part of his initial report using the SWOT analysis from there he may initiate actions essential to the growth of sales. SWOT analysis according to Robert Price is helpful in the â€Å"analysis of the external environment†¦ and internal situation† to see the whole scenario of the problem (p. 104). Second, he may suggest innovation of the product to be introduced as a new model through which the customer may perceive the product having good quality that will â€Å"solve critical customer problem† (Rafinejad, p. 208). Product innovation should be carefully planned to attain the best improvement of the product because as Rafinejad stated, â€Å"†¦too many revisions to a product are disruptive to customers’ business operation and create confusion† (ibid). Third, the company may notify the public through a well-developed notification plan which may includes â€Å"customers’ reaction to the planned changed† (Rafinejad, p. 210). Once the customers’ wants finally established, a formal change notification may take place; this involves e-mail notification, advertising, and other public relation tasks. The need for strong sense of business ethics rooted on customer satisfaction must also be emphasized. This generally requires internal streamlining. Bjorn Andersen stated that business ethics has â€Å"a strong motivational effect that can spur individuals and indeed entire organization to unheard-of peaks of performance† (p. 7). This creates basically a true sense of dedication on the part of the employees in the delivery of products to the customers. To realize this goal, the company has to redefine corporate culture and restructure the organization in such a way that supports the objective of the company as part of the innovation process. Redefinition includes identifying corporate social responsibility approach with hands on business practices through transformation process on the operation level. Andersen mentioned that the process involves policy setting, overall image creation, and pointing out direction for the organization’s ethics endeavor (p. 28). To support the endeavor, the company has to evaluate its structure in a way that accountability for success and/or falling is determined. Likewise, certain business activities must be redirected through assigning corporate ethics program. Linda K. Trevino and Gary R. Weaver suggested to â€Å"formalize company values and expectations† in which multiple elements has to look into such as â€Å"dedicated staff, supporting structures and policies, and extensive employee involvement† (p. 91). Conclusion: The new Vice President of Sales with his expertise in the field of business may share his knowledge that will help the business grow. The defective wrenches may cause the business to fall due to customer complaints that are not dealt with properly. Assigning tasks that will save the image of the company will be realized through initiatives for change in products and corporate ethics. This will be done by means of undertaking strategic planning based on research that may include adapting new policies for the company. Reference Andersen, B. (2004). Bringing Business Ethics to Life: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility. USA: American Society for Quality. Cichelli, D. J. (2003) Compensating the Sales Force: A Practical Guide to Designing Winning Sales Compensation Plans. USA: McGraw-Hill Professional. Price, R. (2007) The Eye of Innovation: Recognizing Possibilities and Managing the Creative Enterprise. USA: Yale University Press. Rafinejad, D. (2007) Innovation, Product Development and Commercialization: Case Studies and Key Practices for Market Leadership. USA: Ross Publishing. Trevino, L. K. & Weaver, G. R. (2003). Managing Ethics in Business Organizations: Social Scientific Perspectives. USA: Stanford University Press.

Accounting Capstone Essay

It appears to me that both companies have had some weaknesses and have shown some improvements. I am wary of Pepsico because its current liabilities have increased faster than its assets. However, Coca-Cola’s assets have decreased along with its liabilities. Both companies have increased inventory, though Pepsico’s increase has been much higher than Coca-Cola’s (9.86% to 0.28%). Normally, this is cause for concern, but both companies’ inventory turnover also has improved. There are several other pros and cons for both companies. One reason to be cautious about either one is that they both have weak acid test ratios. Pepsico’s fell from 0.95 to 0.87. Coca-Cola’s fell from 0.81 to 0.72). An acid-test ratio of less than 1 shows that a company will have difficulty paying its debts. My final decision is based on profitability. Pepsico’s profit margin decreased from 14.4% to 12.5%. Coca-Cola’s decreased from 22.3% to 21.1%. See more:  Manifest Destiny essay Both have decreased, but Coca-Cola’s is much higher. So, I would choose Coca-Cola. What Does Acid-Test Ratio Mean? A stringent indicator that determines whether a firm has enough short-term assets to cover its immediate liabilities without selling inventory. The acid-test ratio is far more strenuous than the working capital ratio, primarily because the working capital ratio allows for the inclusion of inventory assets. Calculated by: Investopedia explains Acid-Test Ratio Companies with ratios of less than 1 cannot pay their current liabilities and should be looked at with extreme caution. Furthermore, if the acid-test  ratio is much lower than the working capital ratio, it means current assets are highly dependent on inventory. Retail stores are examples of this type of business. The term comes from the way gold miners would test whether their findings were real gold nuggets. Unlike other metals, gold does not corrode in acid; if the nugget didn’t dissolve when submerged in acid, it was said to have passed the acid test. If a company’s financial statements pass the figurative acid test, this indicates its financial integrity

Caring for populations Essay Example for Free

Caring for populations Essay A community health nurse must be effective in targeting the population as a whole. The nurse will determine the needs for the community by using the data compiled from a windshield survey. As stated in the text, â€Å"A population focus also involves a scientific approach to community health nursing: an assessment of the community or population is necessary and basic to planning, intervention, and evaluation for the individual, family, aggregate, and population levels† (Nies & McEwen, 2011). The purpose of this paper is to establish a priority health problem of the community of Harlingen, based on demographic, epidemiological data and a windshield survey of the area. The community assessment for this project is Harlingen, Texas. According to the 2010 United States Census Bureau, its population is about 64,918 of which 47.8% are male and 52.2% are female. The density is approximately 1629.1 residents per square mile. The racial makeup is 1.0% Black or African American, 79.5% Hispanic or Latino, 18.0% White, 1.9% from two or more races, 1.3% Asian, 0.1% Native American. The median household income, 2008-2012 was $34,096 in Harlingen, compared to $51,563 in the state of Texas. The percentage of persons below poverty level from 2008-2012 was 33.2% in Harlingen, compared to 17.4% in Texas. The city of Harlingen is in the center of the Rio Grande Valley. It is a community which has a transient population of â€Å"Winter Texans.† These Winter Texans are generally retirees from the northern states, who come to the warmer climates to escape  the winter weather of their home states, usually between November and March. Harlingen has one mall, two medical hospitals and one mental health state facility, two libraries, one community college and numerous schools from primary to high school levels. Demographic and Epidemiological According to the website, County Health Rankings & Roadmaps, for Cameron County in 2014, teen pregnancy is measured by the teen birth rate per 1,000 female population, ages 15-19. The number for Cameron county teen births is 80, the number for Texas as a state is 57. There is poor quality of life in relation to health in Cameron County. 30% of the population has poor or fair health, compared to 18% in Texas. Cameron County also has an adult obesity rate of 27%, 21% of physical inactivity while there is 69% of access to exercise opportunities. 16% of the population suffers from excessive drinking and 396 counts of sexually transmitted infections. 36% of the population is uninsured, 86% graduated high school, 10.5% are unemployed and there are a whopping 48% of children in poverty, which has increased from the 2008-2012 numbers. The top causes of mortality in Texas are diseases of the heart, followed by Cancers and Respiratory diseases. During the observation of Harlingen for the Windshield Survey project, overweight residents were visible. The majority of the population is Hispanics, most were slightly overweight and appear relatively healthy. There are nursing homes and assisted living facilities in the community and they are mainly Hispanic and White older adults who are a mix of thin and frail to obese and unhealthy. Women are seen pushing strollers on the jogging trails, while the young children play in the parks. There are groups of teens who play football and basketball in the same area. In the residential areas, some people can be seen outside maintaining their properties, while other properties are dilapidated. The general appearance of the residents are healthy, with some being overweight. I have seen a few multimedia billboards for the local hospital, which is displaying an ad for bariatric surgery, which is appropriate for the current overweight population. Harlingen has some city parks and Boys and Girls clubs and numerous gyms in the area that are heavily utilized. The restaurants in the  area are mainly along the expressway and lining the few main streets around town. There is no food sold along the street, but people can be seen sitting in the parks eating meals. In Harlingen, the population is overweight Hispanics and Whites who have access to healthcare and wellness measures, as it is advertised constantly. There is adequate transportation and resources available for the population. As stated before, Cameron County has an adult obesity rate of 27%, 21% of physical inactivity while there is 69% of access to exercise opportunities. While the averages for the state of Texas are 29%, 24% and 74%, respectively. Cameron County also has a limited access to healthy foods, 16% and 21% food insecurity and a mere 17% of children are eligible for free lunch. Since Harlingen and Cameron County have high obesity rates compared to the rest of the state, the Healthy People 2020 objectives applicable for Harlingen include: NWS-11 (Developmental) Prevent inappropriate weight gain in youth and adults and NWS-9 Eliminate very low food security among children. (Healthy People 2020, 2014) While these are two distinct objectives they are connected, much education will be need to be done to ensure change. The community needs to be educated and held accountable for their actions, at times they are unaware of how much damage an unhealthy diet can do. The Community Health Nurse must prepare for these challenges and have a good understanding of how to present information that will gain the interest of the population. A community health nurse must be well versed in the numerous efforts that are starting to prevent childhood obesity. There are new physical education requirements, nutrition standards for beverages and foods sold in school, to community initiatives to expand bike paths and improve recreational facilities (Koplan, Liverman &Kraak, 2005). â€Å"Families need to make their homes to more conducive to a healthful diet and daily physical activity (Koplan, Liverman &Kraak, 2005). The nurse will need to get out to the community via health fairs, school assemblies, media outlets, etc. to get the message out there. Education on making healthy choices, getting adequate exercise and making small adjustments to their daily lives will help. According to the article, Relative and Absolute Availability of Healthier Food and Beverage Alternatives Across  Communities in the United States, there was a study that was conducted on 3 years of data from the Bridging the Gap Community Obesity Measures Project. It stated the mean healthier food and beverage ratio was 0.71, meaning that stores averaged 29% fewer healthier than less healthy products. There were less availability of healthy alternatives in Hispanic communities (2014). The community health nurse needs to be an expert in assessing and diagnosing health concerns in the community to be able to set realistic goals that will maintain the health of the population. Health promotion, education and community involvement are crucial. â€Å"Nutritional education is essential and must include parents, teachers, and the child† (Nies & McEwen, 2011). The community should know and understand the food pyramid, how to make healthy choices and the importance of balancing intake and exercise. References County Health Rankings & Roadmaps. (n.d.). Retrieved November 20, 2014, from http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/texas/2014/rankings/cameron/county/outcomes/overall/snapshot Koplan, J., Liverman, C.T., Kraak, V.I., & Institute of Medicine, (.(U.S.). (2005). Preventing Childhood Obesity: Health in the Balance. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. Nies, M. A., & McEwen, M. (2011). Community/Public Health Nursing (5th ed.). MO: Elsevier. Nutrition and Weight Status. (n.d.). Retrieved November 20, 2014, from http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/nutrition-and-weight-status/objectives United States Census Bureau. (n.d.). Retrieved November 20, 2014, from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4832372.html Zenk,S.N., Powell, L.M., Rimkus, L., Isgor,Z., Barker,D.C., Ohri-Vachaspati,P., & Chaloupka, F. (2014). Relative and Absolute Availability of Healthier Food and Beverage Alternatives Across Communities in the United States. American Journal Of Public He alth, 104(11), 2170-2178. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014-302113 Caring for populations. (2016, Aug 20).

Food labeling Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Food labeling - Essay Example Even while conceding to the fact that most consumers probably do not read food labels and labels add to the cost of foods, there is a strong rationale for labelling. Food labelling provides consumers with a breakdown of the primary ingredients and composites contained in a food product and, of course, its calorific value. More recently, and as a result of growing health awareness, carbohydrate value was added to food labels (Charles, 2001). There are several reasons for the mandatory labelling of food products, the majority of which derive from the notion of the right to know and from health issues. As regards the first, consumers have a right to know the composition of the food products they are purchasing so that they can make an informed purchase decision. As regards the second, food labelling information is imperative for the millions who suffer allergies, have health issues or are required to adhere to a certain diet. In other words, the value and importance of labelling can har dly be overstated, especially when considering that allergies can be fatal. Therefore, there is a strong reason and specific purpose for mandatory food labelling but the question is whether or not the purpose of food labelling is satisfied. Although most all countries have f... According to Weirich (2007) some countries do not have national laws mandating food labelling while others have made the comprehensive listing of all ingredients and composites, a non-negotiable imperative. In the Middle East, and in compliance with both national laws and international standards, the nutritional information of foods is clearly stated on labels printed onto, and not stuck on, food packages. The mandated information is calorific value, nutritional value, ingredients and additives (Weirich, 2007). Laws in the United States have made the listing of all ingredients, additives, nutritional values and calorific value imperative. Again, labels are printed onto and not stuck on the packages for the purposes of avoiding any possibility of tampering with the labels (Weirich, 2007). The European Union has, by far, the most stringent of the food labelling policies. According to Summers (2007), EU food labelling policies mandate the inclusion of all information related to nutritional and calorific value, ingredients and additives and, importantly, a clear indication of whether any GM ingredients had entered into the making of the product in question (Summers, 2007). While much of the information printed onto these labels tends to escape the understanding of consumers as it is highly scientific, it is still important. Its importance stems from the fact that consumers who suffer from specific allergies will be able to, when reading the label, determine whether the food is safe for their consumption or not. Its importance is also due to the fact that food labelling provides diabetics and obese consumers with the information they need for the limitation of their intake of

The Stranger by Albert Camus Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

The Stranger by Albert Camus - Essay Example Meursault's character is a statement about the author's view of the irrationality of the universe and how humans are making it complicated through insisting that life is purposeful. The exposition part of the plot revealed so much about Meursault's concept of the word "emotions." The story began with news that his mother passed away through a telegram. Contrary to the expected reaction of a son who just lost a parent, he did not turn out to be sentimental, or at least sentimental in a masculine way. Instead, he cared more about what day and time his mother died. The diction and tone used by Camus is entirely helpful upon establishing Meursault's persona. To directly say that "Mother died today, or maybe yesterday; I can't be sure" (Camus 4) is a perfect portrayal of being indifference towards the death of a loved one. It is noticeable however, that Meursault is emotionally detached from his own mother, which made sense if he would be the same with the rest of the people around him. T he physical world is more important to him than what really matters according to society's opinion, such as love and the concept of a meaningful life.

Promotional Strategy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Promotional Strategy - Essay Example In order to maximize sales volume and reach as many customers as possible, the company will aim to use more of a ‘pull’ promotional strategy (Lamb, Hair & McDaniel, 2008), in tandem with the ‘push’ strategy which will be more subtle. The aim is to entice the end users to pull the EJ’s Innovation and More product from the manufacturer or the distributor into their homes. Sales promotion in the first phase of the campaign will be extensive but will be monitored closely. As this represents a cost that can be controlled, if the response of the customers is more than expected in certain cities or areas, sales promotions will be curtailed in those regions.  Pull Strategy With this strategy, the company is hoping to reach a massive audience, as has been defined previously. Strategies will include heavy television, radio, print, online and billboard advertising, especially in the major cities all over the U.S. The special features of EJ’s Innovations and More laptops and PCs such as touch-screen would be very creatively, yet simply, advertised to the customers. Special contests would be advertised online and in print which would allow every ten thousandth customer to get a lap top or PC with any five additional features of his choice. Similar tactics will continue throughout the campaign to attract new customers to the product. The company has plans to invest in trade advertising and incentives to encourage support businesses to push the new range of laptops

See details for specifications Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

See details for specifications - Essay Example On the same note of laws, ethical issues, and nursing practice and decision making, this essay aims at comparing three articles within which these issues are addressed especially how legal and ethical factors usually affect clinical nursing practices and the consideration that nurses must consider in making decision within their practice. Article 1: Confidentiality, Secrecy, and Privacy in Ethics Consultation Gerald Neitzke (2007) conducted a research on Confidentiality, secrecy, and privacy in ethics consultation. According to Neitzke, confidentiality is likely to pose problems especially to counselors and he noted that these challenges are can be in two different ways including the uncertainty on the actual extent of the optimum practice and the problem in implementing the ethical practice within a nursing practice. Nonetheless, Neitzke noted in his article that the British association for the counseling had once published some codes of ethics to help counselors to resolve the dile mma. Additionally, Neitzke acknowledged that these counselors are sometimes challenged with the law as they undertake their duties (Neitzke, 2007). It should be noted that law and ethical values can only be breached in this situation if the client or patient feels that their confidentially have been interfered with without their consent. Therefore, Neitzke noted that if such dilemmas have to be minimized or eradicated, it is then vital for the medical practitioners in this case the counselors to seek permission to breach the confidentiality of their patients. Neitzke discussed three ways through which breaking of confidentiality is permissible and they include the counselor seeking the consent of the patient or client to break their confidentiality. Additionally, the counselor can break the confidentiality of the patient if such information regarded confidential are already in the public domain. Finally, a nurse which in this case if a counselor, may be at liberty to break person co nfidentiality if the public interest in the protection of such information outweighs personal interest in the disclosure or use of such information. It should be noted that if counselors are obliged legally to break personal confidentiality, they will be protected the law for such break (Neitzke, 2007). In the cotemporary world, keeping confidential information about client is usually vital for counselor especially for maintaining perfect relationship with clients and or maintaining their practice. Therefore, these professionals must only breach the confidentiality law in situations demanded by law; otherwise, they will lose trust from their clients; thus, interfering with their business and practice. In some cases, they may be taken to court to answer to their unethical and unprofessional behaviors. Hence, despite the fact that the law may give the nurse or the counselor in Neitzke’s case the right or protection to provide some private information about their clients, they m ust only do so without exterior motives or in a manner to harm their clients (Neitzke, 2007). Regardless, of the window that confidentiality in nursing and counseling practice can be breached

Relationship between the Industrial Revolution and three of the Essay - 1

Relationship between the Industrial Revolution and three of the ideologies - Essay Example The technique is necessary for identification of both primary and secondary stakeholders with stakes in the running of the project. Stakeholder analysis aims at developing a strategic view of the human and institutional landscape. The process of managing stakeholders for any project involves aspects such as identification of all stakeholders, documentation of stakeholder needs, assessment and analysis of influence from stakeholders, managing various expectations from stakeholders, taking actions and review of the status of the project (Phillips, 2003). Stakeholders are known to provide organizations with a range of resources, such as customers, employees and capital, amongst other benefits necessary for conducting businesses. These resources create a link between stakeholders and organizations, hence making organizations responsible for their social and legitimate actions towards consumers. The shift in thinking from financial perspective demands that business organizations consider the impact of their activities on a wide range of stakeholders. Currently, there is a more pressing demand from consumers on the extent to which companies deal with environmental matters. This has made organizations play a vital role in shaping public opinion and environmental policies by complying with social and stakeholder demands, hence legitimizing themselves to acceptable organizational and societal practices (McDonnell and Bartlett, 2009, pp. 63–70; Baker, 1997). Consumers, governmental organizations, and other insurance companies will ma jorly influence this project. All forms of governmental regulations are meant to grant consumers an opportunity to make better environmental decisions. However, difficulties arise especially at the point of establishing policies capable of addressing all areas of concern within the environment (De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005). A good example can be drawn from the

Asian Economic Development Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2750 words

Asian Economic Development - Essay Example To understand these would bring clarity to the phenomenal success of this unique and dazzling city-state. The early 19th century saw the British expanding their dominions in India. It was also the time of growing trade with China, primarily for the precious tea sought by the British market. The extensive route that British merchantmen had to follow led them into territorial waters dominated by the Dutch and their East Indies colonies in Malaya. Malay pirates also roamed the route which made the British feel isolated and their position precarious in the region. It was important for Britain to open a port that could refit, revitalize, and protect its merchant vessels. Aside from the need to secure their mercantile fleets and their cargo, Britain was also looking for ways to check Dutch expansion in Southeast Asia. Thus, The Governor-General of India, Lord Hastings, instructed Sir Stamford Raffles to establish a trading station on the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. Raffles chose the island of Singapore (Flower 1984). Raffles thought of ways to establish British hold and attr... Thus, Singapore was snatched by the British from right under their noses. To attract traders which were already engaged in Dutch ports, he made Singapore into a free port. Traders could come and sell their goods without paying tariffs or taxes. This attracted Malay and Chinese tradesmen and all sorts of goods flooded into the island. Settlements grew and soon, free trade and strategic location transformed Singapore into a major centre for commerce in the region. Trade continued to flourish and what used to be a simple fishing grew as a free port espousing free trade, welcoming traders from all over the region. Singapore became a Crown colony after the Second World War in 1945. In 1959, it was granted self-government and joined Malaysia in September 1963. However, differences between leaders brought about separation and Singapore became an independent nation in 1965 (History of Singapore 2006). To date, Singapore's location, harbour and free port remain as its strong geographic advantages. With a small land area and population, the country is dependent on international trade which is much lager than its domestic market. In fact, as it recovered from the Asian financial crisis in 1988, its international trade was thrice its domestic earnings. This strength also proves to be its vulnerability, since its dependence on international trade also makes it sensitive to the fluctuations in the international market. As the country responds well to periods of growth and prosperity, minor negative developments in international trade can also result to major recessions in the Singaporean economy. Although domestic leadership and policies try to mitigate the effects of a constantly

History of Circle Essay Example for Free

History of Circle Essay The word circle derives from the Greek, kirkos a circle, from the base ker- which means to turn or bend. The origins of the words circus and circuit are closely related. The circle has been known since before the beginning of recorded history. Natural circles would have been observed, such as the Moon, Sun, and a short plant stalk blowing in the wind on sand, which forms a circle shape in the sand. The circle is the basis for the wheel, which, with related inventions such as gears, makes much of modern civilization possible. In mathematics, the study of the circle has helped inspire the development of geometry, astronomy, and calculus. Early science, particularly geometry and astrology and astronomy, was connected to the divine for most medieval scholars, and many believed that there was something intrinsically divine or perfect that could be found in circles. The compass in this 13th century manuscript is a symbol of Gods act ofCreation. Notice also the circular shape of the halo| Circles on an old astronomy drawing| Some highlights in the history of the circle are: * 1700 BC – The Rhind papyrus gives a method to find the area of a circular field. The result corresponds to 256/81 (3.16049) as an approximate value of π. * 300 BC – Book 3 of Euclids Elements deals with the properties of circles. * In Platos Seventh Letter there is a detailed definition and explanation of the circle. Plato explains the perfect circle, and how it is different from any drawing, words, definition or explanation. * 1880 – Lindemann proves that π is transcendental, effectively settling the millennia-old problem of squaring the circle.

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market

black bear Essay -- essays research papers fc

Black Bears The black bear is the smallest North American bear. The adults are usually less than six feet long and stand about two to three feet tall at shoulders. The weight of a black bear varies between 125-500 ponds. They have small eyes and rounded ears. Also their snout is very long. Each paw has five very strong claws, which is used for tearing, digging, and climbing. One single hit from the front paw is enough to kill an adult deer. A black Bear is a true carnivore, but if not prevented the black bear could be a huge problem to humans. A black bear loves to eat fresh leaves, berries, fruits, nuts, roots and also Insects and small mammals. When fall comes near, a black bear must eat large amounts of food in order to gain enough weight to keep them through winter hibernation. During hibernation when a little bit warmer weather comes near the black bear must awaken and take short excursions outdoors, so they can get a drink or some food. This is so the black bear will be able to go back to sleep easier. During hibernation a black bear will stay in a cave or some kind of stone formation. Usually it will be near a creek or stream. The area around the cave will usually have a lot of vegetation. If the cave does not have any water or food around it the black bear will try to find another place to sleep through the winter. That place will have plenty of food and water. During the short excursions outdoors during hibernation the bear looks for replenishments, this is why the bear must be near food and water (Rieffberger 8). A black bear’s habitat usually depends on two factors. One is vegetation and the other is human activity. A black bear usually is not picky about a place to stay if it has got food and is not too close to human activity. A dense forest under story, which includes brushy territory or a lot of downed trees, which fell due to the weather, usually characterizes a black bear’s habitat. Once spring starts coming around, black bears start emerging from their hibernation. They move around the area a lot, because they are looking for a new place which has good cover to stay under and a lot of vegetation a round (Rieffenberger 8). Black bears are becoming more and more of a problem. If people have garbage or food that they have thrown out, a black bear may come and get it. To keep a black bear out of the garbage, you need to get rid of th... ... are calm at most times and are only angered mostly by humans. Black bears usually breed in the spring and the young leave their mothers in the second summer of their life. Because of their endangered species status, the DNR have established sanctuaries protect black bears. In 1944, a black bear season was established. Only during this time could hunters kill black bears. Due to this new protection law, the black bear population began to rise. In the future, it will be a common sight to see a few black bears in your county. Works Cited Houchins, Stephen C, James E. Craft, and Jerry R. Duffield. Procedures for Handling Nuisance Bears. Wildlife Resources Section 1999 How to Avoid Bear Damage and Nuisance Problems. West Virginia Division of Natural Resources. 1996 Rieffenberger, Joseph C. et. al. West Virginia Black Bear. Wildlife Resources Division. 1981 U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. American Black Bear. 1994. 28 October, 1999. http://frogweb.nbii.gov/features/kidscorner/bbear.html/>   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   West Virginia Division of Natural Resources. 1899 Black Bear Hunting Season. Wildlife Resources Section 1999.

cell division :: essays research papers

Cell Division   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Why must cells divide? To start it off, cells can’t keep growing forever, so when they reach a certain size they will have to divide. Cells divide for four important reasons; reproduction, growth, repair, and replacement of damaged or worn out cells. Most cells divide at least once during their life cycle and some divide divide dozens of time times before they die. There are three types of cell division. They are binary fission, mitosis, and meiosis. When cell division is in the form of mitosis it is usually associated with cell growth, replacement, and repair. When the cell goes through meisosis it usually involves asexual reproduction. Both the process of mitosis and meiosis involve the duplication of the DNA and the splitting of the nucleus. Mitosis is a type of cell division that produces two genteically identical cells from a single cell. Mitosis is basically a process that cells goes through to to form two new nuclei, with each nuclei containing the same number of chromosomes. Mitosis is used by many unicellular eukaryotic organisms for reproduction. Multicellular organisms use mitosis for growth, repair, and the cell replacement. An example of a multicelluar organism using mitosis for cell replacement is in the human body, the human body have about twenty-five million mitotic cell divisions occur every second to replace the cells that have finished their life cycles. There are five phases in the mitosis process. The phases are interphase, prophase, metaphase, anaphase, and telophase. In every living things there are cells. But each living thing only begin life with one cell. The single cell soons begin to take in materials it needs to grow. While the cell is taking in the important materials it is also growing. When the cell is dividing, multiplying, and building it is going through growth. The cell continues with the process of multiplying, dividing, and building until it is fully developed. As the cell grow it changes in its form and what it does.